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ADMIRALTY.

The Supreme Court of the United States has recently
29, 1897) handed down a decision (not yet reported) in
a very interesting admiralty case: O'Brienv. Miller
Bottomry,
Construction et al. The first question considered by the court
of Contract
was whether a bottomry and respondentia bond,
executed by the master of the "Andrew Johnson," covering
that vessel and its cargo, and, also, that portion of the cargo
which had been trans-shipped on the " Mary J. Leslie," was
avoided by the loss of the "Andrew Johnson " in a collision
with the ship " Thirlmere," because the defeasance clause of
the bond provided that it should become void upon the loss of
" said vessel." This question was answered in the negative,
the Supreme Court, in a very able opinion by Mr. Justice
White, holding that the words " said vessel," when read with
the contract as a whole, could not be construed so as to indicate solely the "Andrew Johnson." The Circuit Court of
Appeals had considered them free from ambiguity and as
leaving no room for construction, but Mr. Justice White said
this was a confusion of thought "in failing to distinguish
between the contract as a whole and some of the words found
therein." His arguments in favor of the construction he put
upon the contract are unanswerable.
The second question with which he had to deal was whether
owners of the "Andrew Johnson" could escape a personal
Limitation of liability for their due proportion of the amount of
Liability of the bond, on the ground of the loss of that vessel,
Ship-owners while retaining the damages they had recovered
in their suit against the " Thirlmere," which caused the loss.
This question also was answered in the negative. It was
asserted that Congress intended, when passing the Act of
March 3, 1851 (Chap. 43, 9 Stat. 638; Rev. Stat. § 4282
(Nov.

el seq.), to compel the ship-owner, in order to be able to claim

the bencfit of the limited liability, to surrender to the creditors
of the ship all rights of action which are directly representative
of the ship and freight.
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A further question which the court felt it was not compelled to deal with, though raised by counsel arguendo,
because not averred in the pleadings, was as to the
Necessity of
Communica- necessity of communication between the master
tion
before
and owner before the former can hypothecate the
Hypothevessel or cargo. The court intimated, however,
eating
that the more modern English rule, which only
requires communication where it is reasonable to expect an
answer within a convenient time, would be followed, and said:
"We think the duty was upon the party who questioned the
power of the master to have executed the instrument of
hypothecation to plead it as a matter of defence."
Judge Brown, of the Southern District of New York, has
recently decided that, although the stranding of a vessel may
be due to poor navigation on the part of its master,
its owner may recover from the cargo a general
Aeneral
tha
Average
average contribution on account of the injury the
vessel has suffered in saving the cargo. While he admits the
general rule that one whose fault has caused the injury cannot
recover for what he has suffered, the learned judge assigns as
the sole reason for it, that the ship-owner would have to
restore to the cargo's owner as damages whatever he might
collect as general average. As, by the Harter Act of 1893
(2 Supp. Rev. Stat. p. 81), the ship-owner is relieved from all
responsibility to the cargo for the navigation of the ship, his
right to a general average contribution "arises necessarily by
the same principles of equitable right that apply in ordinary
cases of general average."
As the whole object of the Act is to modify the relation
previously existing between the vessel and her cargo, and to
establish one of non-responsibility for damages or loss arising
out of bad navigation, (The Delaware, i6i U. S. 459, 1895,)
granting Judge Brown's premises, his conclusion seems inevitable but unjust.
It was further held, that the allowance of gross freight on
the cargo jettisoned was proper; the cargo-owners having
Gross Freight unsuccessfully contended that it should be net
Allowed
freight, after deducting the cost of handling at a
port of delivery: Cluyrstalv. Flint, 82 Fed. 472.
Ship or Cargo

AGENCY.

One who deals with an agent of another and who, upon
Recourse to receiving the agent's individual notes, gives an
Principal
absolute receipt, cannot afterwards hold the principal who has settled with the agent on the faith of the
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receipt: English v. Ranchfuss, (Supreme Court,) 47 N. Y.
Suppl. 639.
Nitting v. Kings County El. R. Co., 47 N. Y. Suppl. 327,
affirms a familiar principle of agency. Defendant having
obtained from plaintiff the right to construct its
Liabilityof
Principal
road in front of his property, and having so constructed the road, could not afterwards refuse to recognize
its agent's authority to promise plaintiff the sum he agreed
to pay. A principal cannot retain the fruit of his agent's
acts and yet disclaim his authority in order to escape the
corresponding obligation.
Agency cannot be proved by the uncorroborated testimony
of the agent, nor can any implication of consent
Proof,
to the work done arise, in the absence of proof of
Evidence
knowledge that it was being done: Roberge v. Menheimer,
47 N. Y. Suppl. 655.
ASSIGNMENTS

FOR CREDITORS.

A general assignment of a corporation for the benefit of
creditors does not constitute a breach of its outstanding contracts when the corporation continues to exist,
has the capacity to sue and be sued, and the assignee is not prohibited by anything contained in the assignment, or in the said contracts, from carrying on the business
and completing the contracts of the corporation : In re Carter
(Supreme Court), 47 N. Y. Suppl. 383.
A general assignment for creditors does not, Per se, constitute a breach of a contract of the assignor to do work or perform services for a third party. In re Carter, 27
Unfinished
N. Y. Suppi. 383, a shipbuilding company, at the
contract,
time of its assignment, had on hand a contract
Effect on
with another company to build a ship for $5o,ooo,
Assignor
had almost completed the ship, and received $42,5o on account
of the price. Some time after the assignment the other company forcibly seized the unfinished ship, and yet presented
against the assigned estate a claim for $42,5oo and also judgment of S29,000, obtained on the bond given by the assigning
company, conditioned for the completion of its contract. These
claims were both disallowed. From the opinion it seems clear
(i) that the title to the ship remained in the assigning company
after the assignment, and (2) that the other company's only
claim against the assigned estate was for the unliquidated
damages occasioned by the breach of contract by the assigning
company. From (I) it may fairly be concluded that the other
company was guilty of a tort in seizing the unfinished ship.
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ATTORNEY AND CLIENT.

An attorney employed to bring suit on a claim in the
name of the assignee may recover for his services from
Right to
the assignor if the assignment is merely nominal,
Recover from and the assignee was the assignor's agent in
Assignor
employing him: Simon v. Shetidan & Shea
Co. (Supreme Court), 47 N. Y. Suppl. 647.
BANKS AND BANKING.

Money on deposit in a bank may be assigned by parol,
and without the consent of the depositary: Opof Deposit penheimer v. First VationalBaik of Butte (Supreme
Court of Montana), 50 Pac. 419.
Assignment

CARRIERS.

The Supreme Court of New York has added another to
the long list of decisions defining the rights, duties and liaIn
Contract of bilities of common carriers of passengers.
Carriage,

this case a passenger boaraed a train upon the

assurance of the station agent that it would stop
at a certain place, when, as a matter of fact, it
was not scheduled to do so; and, as a result, the passenger
was obliged to get off at an intermediate station and walk to
his destination, a distance of three miles. The court held
that the passenger might recover substantial damages for
breach of the contract of carriage: Miller v. King et al., 47 N.
Y. Suppl. 534.
The Kentucky Court of Appeals has decided in Wood
v. L. & N. R. Co., 42 S. W. 349, that where white perSeparate Cars sons enter a car set apart under the law and the
Damages
for Breach

for White
and Colored
Persons,
Damages

company's regulation
n
r

for colored people, and

abuse or annoy them, the company is responsible-although the employes, while knowing that
the white persons were there, were ignorant of the abuse.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

The Supreme Court of California has decided that, in the
absence of statutory provision, exclusive jurisdiction of an
action against a consul of a foreign government is
Consuls,
State Courts, not vested in the federal courts by art. iii. sec. 2
Jurisdiction of the Constitution of the United States, declaring
that the judicial power of the United States shall extend to all
cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls ; but that such consul may be sued in a state court, and
may, by suffering judgment to go against him by default, waive
his right under the Constitution to have the matter determined
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or the judgment reviewed by the courts of the United States:
Wilcox v. Litco, 50 Pac. 758.
The Circuit Court for Montana has reiterated the rule that
a federal court should not grant a writ of habeas corpus when
it appears that the petitioner is held under the
Habeas
Corpus,
judgment of a state court of competent jurisdiction,
Federal and
unless the pivotal point has been finally decided
State Courts

by the Supreme Court of the United States, and

the illegality of his detention is beyond question : In re May,
82 Fed. 422.
The State of Indiana provided by the Act of 1896 for the
incorporation of street railways. Section i I of the Act provides: "This Act may be amended at the discreImpairment
.
tion of the legislature." The railway companies
of
Obligation
Contracts,

Fixing Rail.
road Rates

organized under this Act were expressly given the

right to fix rates of fare.

~
lature

Last year, the legis-

passed an Act reducing the fare
of street

railway companies in cities of the first class, (which included
only Indianapolis,) to three cents. The railway company
secured a preliminary injunction in the United States Court
against the enforcement of this last Act : 8o Fed. 218 (1897).
In order to test the question in the state courts, the city of
Indianapolis brought a suit to recover a penalty under an
ordinance of the city for the alleged misconduct of one Navin
in boarding a street car and refusing to pay the fare demanded,
viz. : five cents. The Supreme Court of Indiana, in 47 N. E.
525 (1897), dismissed the suit on the ground that the Act of
1897 was valid. The United States Court now makes permanent the injunction against the enforcement of the Act for the
the reason that the statute is invalid as impairing the obligation
of a contract.
The Supreme Court of the United States has already decided,
see Regan v. Trust Co., 154 U. S. 362 (1893), also Railway
Co. v. Smith,

128

U. S. 174 (1888), that when a charter in

definite terms grants to the corporation power to collect a
definite sum per mile for transportation of persons and
property, such express stipulations form a part of the obligation of the state which it cannot repudiate. There is no doubt,
on the other hand, that the State of Indiana can fix the rates of
fare of street railway companies incorporated under the Act
of 1861, provided the reasonableness of the rate fixed by the
legislature can be submitted to the court: Chicago & Grand
Trunk Ry. Co. v. Wellman, 143 U. S. 339 (1892).
The only new point of law, therefore, which the present case
decides, is that when we have a general law of incorporation
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with the right of amendment reserved on the part of the state,
the amendment must affect all the corporations incorporated
under the Act to be a valid exercise of the power on the part
of the state. This is a new rule of law, and will unquestionably have to be passed upon by the Supreme Court of the
United States before the question can be said to be finally
determined : Central Trust Co. of Na'w York v. Citizens Street
Railiay Comfany qf Indianapolis,(Circuit Court of the District
of Indiana,) 82 Fed. i.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has decided that the
appropriation of a reasonable sum of money by the councils
of a city for the creation and maintenance of a
Municipalipolice pension fund is an appropriation to a munities, Police
PensionFund, cipal use, and that the delegation of the distribuPower to Loan tion of the sum appropriated, to a corporation
organized for the purpose of administering such funds, does
not violate sec. 7, art. ix, of the State Constitution, which
provides that "the General Assembly shall not authorize any
. . . city . . . to become a stockholder in any conpany, association or corporation, or to obtain or appropriate
money for, or to loan its credit to any corporation, association, institution or individual:" Commonwealth %,.Walton, i82
Pa. 373.
The ever-recurring question, "What is an original package ?" has been again ruled on, In re -la, (Circuit Court
Montana), 82 Fed. 422, Knowles, J., holding that
Original
when cigarettes put up in small boxes bearing
Packages,
internal revenue stamps (ten cigarettes being
Boxes of
Cigarettes packed in each box, and these boxes placed in a
larger box for convenience in shipping), are shipped from one
state to another, the small boxes constitute original packages;
but when they reach their place of rest for final sale to consumers, they lose this character and become part of the mass
of the property of the state and amenable to its laws. See
also decision of Simonton, J., U. S, C. C. for South Carolina,
in Butckenheinter v. Sellers, 81 Fed. 997.
The Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey has decided that a statute in terms applying only to cities of the
Special Act, first class (cities having a population exceeding
ioooo) and combining in such cities the election
What
Constitutes of municipal officers with elections for state and
county officers, which theretofore had been kept separate, is
in violation of art. iv, sec. 7, paragraph i i, of the State Constitution prohibiting special laws regulating the internal affairs
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of towns and counties (Collins and Dixon, J.J., dissenting):
Wanser v. Hoos, 88 Atl. 449.
CONTEMPT.

A purchaser of real estate at a foreclosure sale was held not
punishable as for contempt in refusing to obey an order of court
requiring completion of the sale. : Burton v. Linn,
47 N. Y. Suppl. 693. This decision was reversed
by the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court

Foreclosure,
Refusal to
complete

Purchase

(Ingraham, J., dissenting), 47 N. Y. Suppl. 835.
In 18o8 Lord Eldon, after some hesitation, in a similar case,
gave the order for judgment against a recalcitrant purchaser :
Lansdown v. Elderton, 14 Ves. 512.

At that time, however,

imprisonment for debt was permissible, and the order of the
High Court of Chancery was "punishable in any case for
disobedience as for contempt." Refusal to pay money into
court after the court's decree is contempt: Wartman v.
rVartman, Taney C. C. 362 (1852); People v. Conpton,
i Duer (N. Y.), 512 (1853); ii'eadv. Norris, 21 Wis. 310
(1867); contra, W'ers v. Becker, 95 N. Y. 486 (1884); but
inability to pay is sufficient to avoid commitment: Smith v.
Smith, 92 N. Car. 304 (1885). In Burton v. Linn (supra),
Russell, J., in the lower court, said. " Inability to pay is not a
crime. .

.

. Where performance is in execution of a contract

simply, the non-payment of money should not be punished as
a crime." The Appellate Division, however, per Rumsey, J.,
said the purchaser would not be relieved from contempt by
inability to pay, and directed that a warrant issue to commit
her to prison until the completion of the sale. This seems a
little remarkable.
CONTRACTS.

A contract whereby a person agrees to pay a sum of
Assignability money in consideration of

the performance

of

certain work is assignable in the usual way: Hand
v. Brooks (Supreme Court), 47 N. Y. Suppl. 583.
As a general rule there can be no recovery of damages for
a breach of contract to loan money when, according to the
terms of the contract, the loan is payable on
demand; but the reason of the rule and the rule
Loan Payable itself ceases when substantial injuries result from
on Demana a failure to make the loan
: Doushkces v. Burger
Breach,

Damages,

Brewing Co.. Limited, (Supreme Court,) 47 N. Y. Suppl. 312.
Where, upon breach of a contract, it appears from the
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nature of the contract that damage may have been sustained
which would be difficult to establish, and a sum,
Breach,
Liquidated not unreasonable, was stipulated for as liquidated
Damages
damages for the breach, such stipulation will not
be treated as a penalty, but will be given effect to in accordance
with its terms: Peekskill, S. C, & M_ R. Co. v. Village of
Peekskill (Supreme Court of N. Y.), 47 N. Y. SuppI. 305.
The rule that parties are presumed to contract in reference
to custom applies only when the terms of the concustom,
Presumption tract are such as to permit its application, without
of Following conflicting with them: Gould's Manufacturing"Co,
v. 11inckenbeck et al. (Supreme Court), 47 N. Y. Suppl. 325.
A party to a contract that is illegal as against public policy,
in that it seeks to control the price and producIllegal
tion of an article of general use, is not estopped
Contract,
to question the validity of the contract in an
Defence
action against him for specific performance: National Harrow Co. v. E. Bement & Sons (Supreme Court), 47
N. Y. Suppl. 462.
An interesting case, involving the interpretation of a coal
lease, has recently been before the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. A coal lease executed in 1864 provided
Lease,
Land,Coal for a royalty
ca, of a certain amount per
n ton upon
half the
one
of
royalty
a
Interpretation "prepared coal," and
of Written amount upon chestnut coal, which was the smallest
Instrument size marketable at that time, At the date of the
lease there were seven kinds of coal recognized in the market,
which, according to size, were as follows : lump, steamboat,
broken, egg, stove No. 3, stove No. 4 and chestnut. Lump
and steamboat coal were the large pieces separated by the
blasts. The other kinds were obtained by screening the larger
pieces through parallel iron bars, or by small pieces which
came from the mines with the lump coal. At the date of the
lease the production of the chestnut coal was about fifteen per
cent. of the output of the mines. After the date of the lease
there ceased to be a market for lump and steamboat coal, and
lessee was compelled to break these in smaller sizes. Two
new kinds of coal, known as pea and buckwheat, came to
have a market value, although at the date of the lease such
small sizes had been thrown on the culm bank as worthless.
The lessees, by breaking, largely increased the production of
chestnut coal, and sold large quantities of pea and buckwheat
on which the) refused to pay royalties.
The Supreme Court held, that the plaintiffs were entitled to
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recover royalties at the higher rate fixed for grades of coal
above chestnut, for all chestnut and pea coal in excess of
fifteen per cent. of the product of the mines. The ground of
the decision seems to rest upon the assumption that the parties
must be presumed to contract upon the conditions as they
existed at the time of the lease, when only fifteen per cent. of
chestnut coal was produced. The lease did not contemplate
the breaking of the mine product to a greater extent than was
common at that time, and, therefore, any coal broken to a
smaller size than chestnut should be paid for at the rate of
larger coal which it would have been under existing conditions
at date of lease.
Mr. Justice Mitchell dissented on the ground that there was
nothing in the lease which contemplated "the breaking of the
whole mine product into the different sizes of what was
prepared coal in 1864, with their proportionate percentages to
one another by means of the methods and appliances in
general use at the time," as found by the master. That on
the contrary, the lease gave the lessee the clear right to produce the various sizes of prepared coal without restriction as
to the proportion of each to the whole. The contract only
contemplates the production of chestnut as an incident to the
production of the prepared sizes. The increase in chestnut is
consequence of increased demand for prepared coals, and is
only a necesa-ary consequent of the production of a greater
amount of such prepared coals. There was no intentional
reduction to chestnut to avoid the p~iyment of royalties.
This, the master finds as a fact. The effect of the decision of
the majority of the court is to make a new contract for the
parties : Wrighl v. IariorRun Coal Co., 38 Atl. 491.

CORPORATIONS.

The Supreme Court of New York has decided that under
sec. 7, ch. 384, of the laws of 1897, which prohibits any corCombination poration doing business in the state to combine
in Restraint with any other corporation or person for the creof Trade, ation of a monopoly, or the unlawful restraint of
Vhen Illegal,
Patented trade or for the prevention of competition in any
Articles
necessary of life, a combination to control the
price and production of a certain article may be illegal, though
its manufacture is protected by patents : National Harrow Co.
v. E. Bcment & Sons, 47 N. Y. Suppl. 462.
The Court of Chancery Appeals of Tennessee in Hills Co. v.
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S.W. 465, has made a decision which will probably meet with no criticism onl the part of those
who bear ini mind that a corporation is the absolute owner of the corporate property. In this ease

42

Corporation
Check,

Offlcers'

Private Debt,
Knowledge
of Taker

the secretary and treasurer gave the check of the
corporation in payment of a private debt due by
the secretary and treasurer as an individual, It was held that
the taker of the check with knowledge that the debt was not
a liability of the corporation was answerable to the corporation for the amount of it.
The decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in
Briggs v. Spaulding-, 141 U. S. 132 (i89I), is bearing fruit of
a somewhat unpalatable kind. It will be remneme-mbezzle.
bered that in that case the court refused to impose
ment by
Cashier,
personal liability upon the directors of a bank,
Negligence of three of whom (in the judgment of the four justDirectors
ices who dissented) had been guilty of such neglect
of duty as had made it possible for the president to loot the
bank. In Warner v. Penoyer, 82 Fed. I8x, the Circuit. Court
for the Northern District of New York has recognized the
binding authority of Briggs v. Spanlding, and has held that
the directors of a national bank are not guilty of negligence,
although they have failed to examine the discount register and
the general ledger of the bank when such an examination
would have enabled them to ascertain that a trusted and respected cashier was engaged in defrauding the bank on a large
scale. The court appears to have reached this conclusion
with regret. In speaking of the conclusiveness of the decision in Briggs v. .Spaulding the following significant language
is used: " This is true even though the court may be convinced that the rule contended for by the dissenting justices is
conducive to greater stability, conservatism and honesty in all
branches of commerce and finance. A somewhat extended
experience in the trial of indictments under section 5209 of
the Revised Statutes has l.d to the conclusion that in fully
half these cases an examination of the books of the bank by
the directors, or an examiner, would prevent failure or at least
would save large sums for the creditors." The court distinguished Gibbons v. Anderson, 8o Fed. 345 (1897), and
Robinson v. Hall, 25 U. S. App. 48 ; 12 C. C. A. 674 (1894),
on the ground that in those cases there were circumstances
which tended to put the directors upon inquiry. Commenting
upon the conduct of the president of the institution, the affairs
of which it was investigating, the court remarked (with perhaps a touch of irony) : " It will hardly be controverted that,
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when compared with Spaulding's directorship in the Buffalo
bank, it is a record of activity and prudence."
The Supreme Court of Tennessee has emphasized the right
of a state to impose stringent conditions upon foreign corpoForeign

Corporations,

Service of
Process

rations as a prerequisite to the right to do busi-

ness within its borders.

By a statute passed in

1875 the State of Tennessee required foreign corporations to file an irrevocable power of attorney

authorizing the Secretary of State to accept services of process in actions instituted against the corporation. The Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Company complied with this
requirement. In 1887 the legislature passed another Act providing for service on any agent of a foreign corporation "found
within the county where the suit is brought who represented
the corporation at the time of the transaction out of which the
suit arose." Service having been had under this latter statute
(although the power of attorney required by the earlier Act
remained in force), the corporation contended that the second
Act impaired the obligation of a contract, and that, in any
event, the judgment rendered against it deprived it of its
property without due process of law. The court dismissed
the contention in regard to the contract without hesitation.
Upon the other point it was compelled to consider St. Clair v.
Cox, io6 U. S. 350 (1882), where service upon a foreign corporation was held invalid when effected upon the agent of a
corporation who was not, at the time, representing it in an
official capacity. The Tennessee court, however, disposed of
the point on the ground that, in the case before it, the agent
was actually employed on~the business of the company at the
date of the service, and refused to declare the statute invalid
merely for the sake of the possible injustice which it might
cause under a different state of facts: Insurance Co. v. Spratley. 42 S. W. 145.
In Gas Light Co. v. Hildebrand, 4 2 S. W. 35 1, it appears
that a gas and electric light company undertook to compel
Quasi-Public one of its customers to give, in advance, security
Corporations, to cover the probable amount of consumption.
Discrimina- The customer brought suit to compel the comtion
pany to supply him, without a compliance on
his part with the condition upon which the defendant insisted. The court hadno difficulty in reaching the conclusion
that the plaintiff was entitled to the relief prayed for, inasmuch
as the condition was not applicable to all the public alike, and
was imposed by the corporation in violation of the duty which

PROGRESS

OF TlE LAW.

rests upon all quasi-public corporations to serve the public
without discrimination.
Clise Investment Co. v. Washington Savings Bank, 50 Pac.
(Washington) 575, represents an interesting application by
SaleofStock the Supreme Court of Washington of the unon Default of doubted principle, that at common law a corpoStockholder
ration has no lien upon the stock of one of its
members for an indebtedness due to it by him.
It appears that the Washington statute, differing from the enactments in force in many states, provides that in case of default
on the part of a stockholder his stock may be sold by the corporation in accordance with the provisions of its by-laws. The
plaintiff corporation had omitted to make provision in its bylaws for this contingency. The court was, therefore, of opinion
that no right to sell existed, while, of course, recognizing that
the corporation was in no way deprived of its right to sue the
stockholder and to sell his stock on execution, subject to the
rights of the defendant corporation, with which the debtor had
pledged it.
In the following case the rule is again stated, that when the
highest judicial tribunal of a state has determined the extent of
the powers and liabilities of corporations, created
';tate
under its laws, that decision is conclusive in the
Decisions
Followed as to national courts in all cases in which no question of
Powerof State general or commercial law, and no question of
Corporations 1
right under the Constitution of the United States
is involved. The court further ruled, that a mortgage given
by a corporation to secure a debt in excess of the amount of
indebtedness, which it had power to incur by the statute under
Ultra Vires which it was organized, is binding on the corporaContract, tion and its subsequent creditors, where the corIndebtedness poration has received the full consideration for the
in Excess of
Statutory debt secured, and the transactions were free from
Limit
fraud. "The statute whose provisions the bonds
and mortgage violate, prescribed no penalty for such a violation. It did not declare that bonds and mortgages issued to
secure an indebtedness in excess of the limitation if fixed,
should be void. Since the legislature imposed no such penalty,
it is not the province of the courts to do so. The remedy for
the violation of this statute is not the destruction of the contracts which evidence it, but the ouster and dissolution of the
corporation at the suit of the state. The state alone can complain of it, and the debtor cannot usurp its functions :" Sioux
Ci , Terminal R. Co. v. Trust Co., 82 Fed. 124.
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CRIMINAL LAW.
2

The English Divisional Court, in Hatton v. Treeby [I897],
Q. B., 452, decided that a policeman who sees a person riding
a bicycle at night
without a light, contrary to the
,>
Municipal
Ordinance, provisions of a statute, has no power to stop him,
Bicycles,
even for the purpose of ascertaining his name and
Lights at
address. An officer, at common law. cannot
Night,
Constable,
Power to

Arrest

interfere with a person without a warrant, except
in cases of felony, or suspected felony, or breaches
of the peace.

Therefore, he had to rely upon

statutory authority, but the difficulty in this was, that while
the statute prohibited such riding, it made no provision for
the apprehension of the offenders. Hence the above result.
The Supreme Court of Washington, in State v. Williams,
5o Fed. 58o, decided, that where a prisoner was brought in
Prisoner
for trial and kept manacled for a time, without any
Fettered at impelling necessity, he was deprived of his conTrial,
stitutional privilege of " the right to appear and
Right to
Appear in
defend in person in criminal cases," as that right
Person
means without his mental or physical faculties
fettered unless his conduct renders it necessary.

EQUITY.

The following points were recently decided in the United
States Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit: In a suit in
equity by a trustee for bondholders to foreclose a
Practice,
mortgage, by which the bonds were secured, certain
Joinder of
Defendants,
Indispensable, banks, which were corporations of the same state
Parties
as the complainant, were joined as defendants.
These banks had liens upon the mortgaged property subsequent to the mortgage. After demurrer to such defendants, the suit was, by leave of court, dismissed as to them
by the complainant. The court, Sanborn, Circuit Judge, held
that the complainant in an equity suit is not required to join
any but indispensable parties to the suit when their joinder will
oust the jurisdiction of the court, and, if he does join them,
the court may permit their dismissal, and thereupon it has the
same jurisdiction and power to proceed to a decree in the case
that it would have had if they had never been made parties to
it. Nor could the subsequent introduction of these banks
and other parties into the suit, or their own petition to protect
their own interests, affect the jurisdiction of the court: Siou.r
City T'rm. R. R. Co. v. Trust Co., 82 Fed. 124.
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FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES.
Layman v. Denton, 42 S. W.

(Tenn.) 153, is a good illustration of the rule that a creditor cannot complain of his debtor's
arowing~rop, disposition of any property which is not subject
Execution, to the payment of the creditor's claim, By the
Exemption by Tennessee statute growing crops cannot be levied
Statute,
upon until after November i 5th of each year; conAlienation
sequently it was held that the creditor could not
interfere with a transfer of the cropS before November I 5th to
another creditor, though the transfer, had it been of ordinary
property, might have been attacked on the ground of its
being intended to delay and hinder creditors.
A conveyance from husband to wife in Tennessee will be
Husband and set aside as against the husband's creditors where
the only evidence of the indebtedness of the husWife,
Evidence
band to the wife is the unsupported evidence of
the spouses; Sanford v. Allen,

42

S. W. (Tenn.) 183.

HUSBAND AND WIFE.

That antenuptial agreements are not affected by recent
married women's acts is amply demonstrated in White v.
White, 47 N. Y. Suppl. 273. A husband having
Antgenuptial there covenanted in such agreement that he would
Agreement,

Married

Women's
Acts, Effect

claim no interest in his wife's estate, it was held
that the guardian of the only child of the marriage
could recover real estate from the father by a quasi-

ejectment proceeding: To the argument that the child was
not a party to the agreement, it was replied that the rule of
priority through legal obligation does not apply to antenuptial
contracts.
Under the community of property system imported from
Southern
Community France, and prevailing in some of the
States, the husband may, upon the dissolution of
Property,
Death of Wife, the firm, as it were, by the death of his wife, pay
Power of
the firm debts out of any firm property which he
Husband
chooses: So held in Burkett v. Key, 42 S. W.
(Tex.) 23 1, that a daughter could not take exception if the
father sold the homestead for this purpose.
Train v. Davidson, 47 N. Y. Suppl. 289, is an interesting
suit by a wife (now married again) against her former husband
from whom she had obtained a divorce, to recover
Divorce,
The deAgreement to sums due under a written agreement.
Procure,
fence set up was, that this agreement was part of a
Validity
larger agreement between the parties who desired
a divorce; that the husband would furnish the wife with evi-
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dence of his adultery and would fail to defend a suit for divorce,
provided she would not ask for alimony or counsel fee. The
court was clear that such an agreement was invalid, and against
public policy as a contract " for the purpose of procuring a
divorce," and was fortified in its conclusion by the additional
averment in the affidavit that the purpose of the entire arrangement was to enable the wife to marry another man.
Russell v. Russell [1897], A. C. 395, is a landmark in the
history of the law as to what constitutes legal cruelty, such
as will justify the injured spouse in asking for a
Divorce,
divorce. The evidence was that the wife had for
Cause,
Charge of
years publicly accused her husband of an unUnnatural
natural crime, with the hope of being able to
Crime
obtain better terms for a private separation. Yet
the House of Lords, after much conflict in the lower court,

decided, by a vote of 5 to 4, that the husband was not entitled to a divorce, being unable to find any other test of legal
cruelty other than the old one of physical danger. The hardship of the rule is apparent when we recollect that, by a writ
of restitution of conjugal rights, the wife would, after such
conduct, apparently be able to demand again the society of
her husband.
Van Vleck v. Vazi Rleek (Supreme Court), 47 N. Y. Suppl.
470, decide; that while it is proper in a suit by wife for
separation to allow counsel fees, they should be
Divorce,
limited to the amount necessary to enable her to
Alimony,
Counsel Fees, prosecute the action ; the allowance made by the
Void
trial judge was reversed, because it was determined
Agreement
in amount by a contract (void as against public
policy) by the wife to pay her attorney a proportion of the
alimony.
Walker v. Walker (Supreme Court), 47 N. Y. Suppl. 5 13,
presents an extremely doubtful problem, viz: Is alimony an
admeasurement by the court of the still-existing
Divorce,
duty of the husband after divorce to support his
Alimony,
Duty of
wife, or is it a substitution for that duty? The
Husband

majority of the court took the former view, and

logically held, therefore, that the amount thereof could subsequently be altered as circumstances required. Cullen, J., dissented. It is to be hoped that the case will go to the Court
of Appeals as the point depends solely upon the principles upon
which divorce laws exist.
Heffing v. Pfaff, 82 Fed. 403, is a neat illustration of the
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kind of complication that justifies the argument of those who
favor an amendment to the Federal Constitution,
Divorce,
Conflict
authorizing the passage by Congress of uniform
of Laws
marriage and divorce laws. A wife, who had lived
in Massachusetts, moved to South Dakota, where she obtained a divorce against her husband, who still remained in
Massachusetts, the court having no jurisdiction over him.
Some time afterwards he married again. Subsequently. she
applied to the same court for an order of alimony, which was
granted without notice to him. Held that his marriage was
not such an affirmance or ratification of the decree of divorce
as gave the court jurisdiction over him, or prevented him from
setting up the lack of jurisdiction in a suit to enforce the payment of the alimony.
The domicile of the husband is that of the wife, despite her
actual residence: So in McClellan v. Carroll,42 S.W. (Tenn.)
185, the law of Tennessee not permitting non-resiDomecle,
dents to claim homestead, it was held that defendant lost her right to homestead by the act .of her
husband in leaving Tennessee for good.
Marriage settlements are good, and payments made in
pursuance thereof cannot be set aside by other creditors,
because marriage is in law a valuable consideraMarriage
Settlement,
tion. So, in Tweed v. Russell, 42 S. W. (Tenn.)
Validity
213, it was decided that where a man agreed,
before marriage, to pay his wife's daughter $300 upon her
marriagc or coming of age, and died before she married or
came of age, his executors properly conveyed to his widow
property worth about $300 in payment of said claim, and
his heirs should not complain of said conveyance.
In Wilson's Assigue v. Wilson, 42 S. W. (Ky.) 404, it was
held (i) that the assignees cannot complain if the assignor
excepts from the deed of assignment certain propMarried
erty, even though the assignor's creditors might
Women,
Assignment, object to the exceptions as a fraud on them, and
(2) that a married woman who, on account of the
Exemption
insolvency of her husband, supports her family, is a "person
with a family," within Ky. Stat. 1 1697, providing for exemptions upon execution against such persons. On the second
point-which would be an important one were such language
more frequent in statutes-three judges dissent on the ground
that the husband certainly remained a "'person with a family," and, consequently, creditors might find, under the majority decision, exemptions claimed by both husband and
wife.
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Equitable Securities Co. v. Talbert, 22 So. (La.) 762, is the
most recent illustration of- the -old maxim that
Married
married women are favorites of the law. A marWoman,
Mortgage,
ried woman was permitted to contradict her own
Acknowledg- acknowledgment that the money due on her prior
ment, Effect
mortgage had been paid, and thus to obtain priority over a subsequent mortgagee, who had apparently
loaned money on the faith of the acknowledgment.
INFANCY.

The Supreme Court of Georgia has decided that the deed
of an infant is binding unless disaffirmed within a reasonable
time after majority; that it is not necessary in
Infants,
Ratification of order to impute notice to him of the existence of
Voidable Deed the deed that there was adverse possession there-

under, if at the time of its execution he has arrived at such
years of discretion that in the ordinary course of events he can
reasonably be supposed to take account of his action and of
incidents occurring in his career: Bentley et al. v. Greer, 27 S.
E. 974.
INSURANCe.

The Supreme Court of Massachusetts, in the case of Westfield Cigar Co. v. Cheshire Couzty Co., 47 N. E. 1026, applies
Arbitration

the rule that a denial of liability is a waiver of the

in Policy

parently applies only in cases of dispute as to the

clause

arbitration clause of the policy.

The clause ap-

extent of liability and the like. (See Biddle on Ins., § 175.)
In People v. Commercial Alliance Life Insurance Co., 47 N.
E. 965, the Court of Appeals of New York considered at
Death After

length the question whether a claim against the
receiver of an insolvent life insurance company

Dissolution

ment of dissolution, but before the filing of proofs

Insured's

Company's

was affected by the death of the insured after j udg-

of claim. It was held that the judgment related back to the
commencement of the action, for the judgment established the
charge of the company's insolvency at that time. The court
had then taken possession of the company's assets, through
the medium of a receiver, for the purpose of distribution
among the creditors, and the amount of the creditors' claims,
was fixed and determined as of that day.
This ruling involves a departure from the earlier cases of
People v. Security L. . & A. Co., 78 N. Y. 114 (t879);
Attorney-General v. Guardian ikzitual L. L Co., 82 N. Y.
336 (i88o), and Attorney-General v. Contincntal L. L Co.,
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88 N. Y. 77 (1882). In the opinion in the Security L. I. & A.
Company case is an elaborate discussion of the nature of a
policy-holder's claim and the difficulty in valuing it strictly
is shown. In the Guardian-Mutual L. I. Company case, it
was held that a claim is not made technically a "death-claim "
by the insured's death after the appointment of a receiver. All
that can be claiined in such a case "is the value of the policy
estimated as of the date when the receiver was appointed;
but in consequence of the death of the insured the actual
value of the policy can be accountably determined: " A. G.
v. ContinentalL. I. Co., supra.
The rule now followed is that applied in cases of mutual
benefit associations in lt re Equitable Reserve Fund Life Ass'n,
131 N. Y. 354 (1892), and People v. Life & Reserve Ass'n of
Buffalo, 150 N. Y. 94 (1896), It is well supported, also, by
precedents in the Federal and State courts,
The question is an interesting one, involving, as it does, the
rules of computation stated in Bell's Case, 9 Eq. Cas. 7o6
(1870); Lancaster's Case, Reilly, Alb. Arb. 76, and Holdiclh's
Case, 14 Eq. Cas. 72 (1872). (See also Biddle on Ins., § 1369,)
A pledgee for collateral security of a contract for the sale
of land has not the" unconditional and sole ownership" of the
premises insured, nor does he own the ground
Insured's
in fee simple within the meaning of a policy conTitle to
Premises, taining such stipulations; furthermore, the
pledgor's interest in the premises falsified the proofs of loss,
and the policy was thereby avoided under its terms : Getteman
v. Comnerciat Union Ass'n Co., 72 N, W. 627,
In ffcDonald v. Insurance Co., 38 Atl. 5oo, a policy of life
insurance contained false statements inserted without the
Aloney had assured's knowledge and through the fraud of the
and Received, assurer's agent.
Upon discovery of the falsity of
Premium,
the statements the company cancelled the policy.
Policy
In an action by the insured to recover the preCancelled
for Fraud
mium, Mr. Justice Blodgett, in delivering the
opinion of the Supreme Court of New Hampshire, said that he
might recover the premium so paid, less a deduction for the
value of the insurance enjoyed by him during the life of the
policy, "and this he may recover in an action for money had
and received, which is an equitable action, and may in general
be maintained Whenever the defendant has money belonging
to the plaintiff, which, in equity and good conscience, he ought
to refund to him "
It is submitted that this decision cannot be sustained. If
the plaintiff be allowed to recover at all, it must be upon the
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theory that the fraud of the company's agent entitled the
plaintiff to rescind the policy. If then he is entitled to rescind,
he is entitled to recover the entire premium, because at no
time was the policy ever in force as against the insurer, (fits.
Co. v. Fletcher, 117 U. S. 5 19) (1885), and the plaintiff therefore never enjoyed any insurance. The case of Ins. Co. v.
Stallam, 93 U. S. 24 (1870), referred to in the opinion of the
court, has no application, for then the policy was in force till
terminated by the non-payment of premiums. If the plaintiff
can recover at all, his measure of recovery is the entire premium, as that is the sum which in equity and good conscience
should be refunded to him. See Mfartin v. Sitwell, i Show.
156 (1691) and Feist v. Parkinson, 4 Taunt. 640 (1812).
MASTER AND SERVANT.

Wyatt v. BrOwn, 42 S. W. (Tenn.) 478, contains an able exposition of the right of a master to discharge his employe, the
employers being the owners of a hotel, of which
Discharge,
the employe had been retained as manager, it was
Excuse for
held that the employe's frequent absence during
the day was not neglect of duty, he testifying that his duties
called him out; but that his habit of taking from 8 until it
every evening for recreation-a time when guests were constantly coming and going-without leaving a competent clerk
to provide for their wants, was a just ground for discharge.
This decision was supported by the further fact -that the manager had allowed and taken part in, gambling in the hotel.
The Supreme Court of N. Y., in Gertuer v. Schmitt, 47 N.
Y. Suppl. 521, decided that where a servant is sent to work at
machinery, to which he is unaccustomed, but the
Duty of
Master to
danger involved is of an open and obvious characWarn Servant ter, as working about rip and circular saws, there
of Danger
is no duty on the master to warn the servant, or
instruct him how to avoid the danger.
to point out what must be obvious.

Words are n6t needed

MORTGAGES.

Oxsheer v. Watt, 42 S.W. (Tex.), 12 1, decides that an action to
foreclose a chattel mortgage is properly brought
in the county in which the notes are payable,
being apparently the county where the maker reBringing
sided, and where, therefore, the holder could

Action to
Foreclose,
Place of

obtain personal service of a writ.
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Although a mortgage be given to secure negotiable notes,
the assignee
Assignment yet it is not itself negotiable, and
thereof takes subject to equities: Equitable Scawrides Co. v. Talbert, 22 So. (La.) 762.
The disagreeable consequences, in jurisdictions where payment of mortgages is enforced by equitable foreclosure proceedings, of failing to summon all junior encumEquitable
Foreclosure, brancers as defendants are seen in Naylor v. ColJunior Enzd//e, 47 N. Y. Suppl. 267. The holder of the
cumbrances junior recorded mortgage
had no difficulty in subjecting the premises to the payment of his mortgage after
sale, under a first mortgage, to a third person.
The Supreme Court of North Carolina, in an opinion by
Judge Douglass, has held that after default in the performance
Oral
of the conditions of a registered mortgage the
Surrender of mortgagee could, by means of an oral surrender
Equity of
Redemption, of the equity of redemption by the mortgagor, beEffect
come the landlord of the mortgagor, so as to
avail himself of the landlord's lien as against the holder
of a subsequent lien, who was bound to know of the
mortgagee's right of entry. The fact that the mortgagee
had, at various times after the creation of the tenancy,
agreed that the mortgagor might redeem upon the payment
of a fixed sum of money, was held to make no difference.
Judges Clark and Montgomery dissented on the ground
that it having been established in Killebrew v. Hines, 104
N. C., 182 (1889), that the lien of a creditor who makes
advances to a mortgagor to make a crop is superior to
that of the mortgagee, because until entry of the mortgagee
the latter is assenting to the mortgagor holding himself
out as the owner of the crop, it followed that such right
could not be defeated by a parol unregistered agreement
between the mortgagor and mortgagee, but that such agreement was good only as between the parties. This certainly
seems to be the sounder view, as the construction adopted by
the majority of the court opens the door to the possibility of
great fraud: Ford v. Green, 28 S. E., 132.
Interstate Building & Loan Assoc., 27 S. E. (S. C.) 948, besides a number-of points irrelevant to this purpose, decides
Purchaseat that a mortgagor cannot, by buying in his propTax Sale by erty at a tax sale, which was brought about by his
Mortgagor
neglect to pay taxes, acquire a title as against his
mortgagee, though a stranger might, perhaps, do so.
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NEGLIGENCE.

A town is not liable for injury to abutting property caused
Maunicipality, by the negligence of the town in allowing a drain
Liability,
under the highway, and the highway itself, to
Defective
remain out of repair in such manner as to turn the
Drain
surface water into the plaintiff's land : laurray v.
Allen (Supreme Court of Rhode Island), 38 Atl. 497.
The Court of Civil Appeals of Texas, in Serafina v. G. H.
& S. A. Ry. Co., 42 S. W. 142, has decided that where a
Probable and railroad company is negligent in allowing sparks
Remote
to escape from an engine, by reason of which a
Consequences person's house is set on fire, they are responsible
in damages to the inmates for injuries resulting from suffocation and cold in being compelled to leave the burning building
at night thinly clad, but not for injuries resulting from their
sleeping on a neighbor's floor.
The Supreme Court of Nevada has decided that a contract
stipulating that a telegraph company " shall not be liable for
Telegraph mistakes or delays in the transmission or delivery,
Companies, or for non-delivery of any unrepeated message
Unrepeated which happen by neglect of its servants or
Message,
Liability otherwise, beyond the amount received for sending
the same" does not relieve the company from
liability for a delay in the delivery of the message not referable to an), mistake in the tenor thereof: Barnesv. Westcrnz
Union Teligraph Co., 50 Pac. 438.
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS.

A delay in presenting a check only discharges the drawer
Check.Delay when lie suffers a loss as a consequence of the
inPresenting, delay: Aferritt v. The Bank, 27 S. E. (Ga.), 979.
Drawer,
See Seele v. iVorlon. 2 M. & R. 401 (1829); RobLiability
inson v. Hawksford, 9 A. & E. N. S. 52 (1846),
and Ames' Cases on Bills and Notes, vol. 2, p. 729, n. 3.
In Aurora Nat. Bank v. Dills, 48 N. E. i9, the Appellate
Court of Indiana held in an action by the indorsee of a
Z
the payee who had indorsed it in
check against
Check,
Indorsement blank that the payee could not show by parol eviin Blank, dence that he indorsed merely as an agent of the
Agency, Parol drawer and notice of this fact to the indorsee. It
Evidence
is impossible t, reconcile the authorities
upon the
question of the admissabi!ity of collateral agreements in
actions upon commercial paper. For an interesting summary
of the law on this point, see Index and Summary (title Col-
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lateral Agreement) to Ames' Cases on Bills and Notes, vol. 2,
p. 803.
That the form of a promissory note is unessential, provided
it contain the essential ingredients thereof, can be seen from the
Promissory recent case of Clarke v. Afarlw, 50 Pac. (Mont.)
713, where a note payable by A. to B. was inNote, Form,
Essential dorsed by B. after maturity to the order of C.,
who subsequently wrote on the back thereof, "I
Ingredients
hereby assume and agree to pay the principal of the within
note," signed "C.," and redelivered the same to B. Held, a
promissory note payable on demand, the payee of which was
B. As to sufficiency of reference to payee, see Ins. Co. v.
Whitney, i Mete. 21 (1840); and that the omission of a time
of payment is equivalent to a promise to pay on demand.
See Leonard v. M7tason, i Wend. 522 (1828).
The holder of an accommodation note made for the benefit
Promissory of the indorser is liable to a holder for value
Note,
Without notice, even though that holder agree
with the indorser to accept a new note from him
Holder,
Liability

and hold the old one as collateral: Nat. Bank v.
D wning, 47 N. E. (Mass.) ioI6.
The holder of a note executed by two makers must, if he
Promissory desires to hold the indorser thereof, be careful to
make presentment and demand on both makers,
Note,
for a failure to do so will discharge the indorser:
Holder,
r
Presentation Co
t Cosy v. Afiracle, 72 N. W. (Iowa) 502; Arnold v.
Dresser, 8 Allen, 435 (1864); Willis v. Green, 5 Hill, 232
([843) accord.
In Tradesmen'sNat'l Bank v. Loonej, 42 S.W. (No. 3) 149,
the Supreme Court of Tennessee reiterated the doctrine that
Promissory the purchaser from a trustee of a note whose
fiduciary character appears upon its face, is bound
Note,
to inquire only as to the right of the trustee to
PTrchse,
Authority of dispose of it, and not as to the trustee's application of the proceeds. Of course, if the nature of
Latter
the transaction indicated an abuse of authority, such as the
trustee's giving the note in payment of a personal debt, the
purchaser would be bound.
If a trustee who indorses as such would escape personal
liability, he must do more than merely add the word
"trustee" to his indorsement, as in the absence of other words,
indicating a clear intention not to assume any personal responsibility, the word "trustee" is merely descriptio persona:
(Tradesmen's Nat'l Bank v. Looney, supra.) See iVfg. Co. v.
for Interest
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Fairbanks,98 Mass. i o I (1867), and Shoe and Leather Bank
v. Dix, 123 Mass. 148 (1877).
Iowa refuses to recognize the correctness of Mr. Justice
Purchaser
for Value,
Collateral
Security

Story's famous dictum in Swift v. Tyson, 16 Peters,
i -subsequently reaffirmed by the Supreme Court
of the United States-that he who takes negotiable paper as collateral security for a pre-existing

indebtedness, is a purchaser for value.
Noteboom v. Watkins, 72 N.W. 766, 767).

(Per Given, J., in

NUISANCE.

The Supreme Court of New York, in Hughes v. City of
Sewage

Auburn, 47 N. Y. Suppl. 235, decided that a city

Accumulating is liable for wrongfully permitting the accumulain a Cellar, tion of sewage in a cellar, thereby causing the death
Who Mlay Sue of one residing in the house over such cellar; and

this, although the decedent had no legal estate or interest in
the premises.
PROPERTY.

In consideration of large gifts of moneys to it by M., a
chartered college bestowed upon him a perpetual scholarship
Execution by in the college, giving him the power to place and
keep therein one pupil who should receive tuition,
Creditors,
board, &c., free of charge. A creditor of M. enRight of
Presentation
to a Scholar- dea%'ored by a proceeding in chancery to expose
for sale this right or power of appointment, but
ship
the Supreme Court of Tennessee held that the right was in no
sense an estate which could be taken in execution, but merely
a privilege to be exercised by and with the consent of the college : Cleveland Nat. Bank v. Oforroz-o, 42 S. W. 200.
REAL PROPERTY.

The Supreme Court of Nebraska was called upon recently
to pass upon a case where, after a woman had died intestate
s eized of certain land, and leaving a husband and
Estoppel
infant son to survive her, the husband falsely
alleged himself to be the guardian of the minor, and by fraud
procurcd a license to sell the land.
In the petition he set forth that the land was his son's.
The land was sold under the license, and the deed purported
to convey all the interest of him, the part), of the first part.
He subsequently quit-claimed his interest in the property to
his son, who, on attaining majority and while his father was
still living, brought ejectment against the purchaser.
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It was held (i) that the father was estopped from setting
up his estate as tenant by the courtesy; (2) that the estoppel
was binding upon a grantee by quit-claim; and (3) that while
the son might have a right after his father's death to avoid
the sale, ejectment being a possessory action, the son's right
to recover must be based upon his present right by the deed
from his father, and therefore must fail: Wells v. Steckelberg,
72 N. W. 865.
A rather extraordinary question recently arose in England
between a trustee in bankruptcy of a former tenant for life and
Tenants for the present tenant for life as to the ownership of a
Life,Fixtures, museum of stuffed birds.
The former tenant for
Mluseum
life had made a collection of birds and had built a
gallery in the house for them. The birds were fastened by
wire and glue, or some similar substance to moveable wooden
trays, which were in iron glass-fronted cases. The cases were
affixed to the wall of the gallery.
The court held that the cases and the trays, as part of the
cases, were fixtures, but that the birds were annexed solely for
the purposes of display, and therefore did not pass with the
freehold.
This case is an excellent illustration of the absurdity of the
former test, which made the fact of physical annexation conclusive of the question whether a particular thing was or was
not a fixture: Gillv. Bullock [1897], 2 Ch. 482.
A warrantee of a title to land who pays off a judgment.
which is an encumbrance on the land, over the warrantor's
Tile to Land, objection, and after proceedings have been begun
by the warrantor to set the judgment aside, does
Breach of
Warranty, so at his peril, and cannot recover for breach of
Cause of warranty of title without showing that the proAction
ceedings to set aside the judgment were
without
merit, and must therefore necessarily have failed to accomplish the purpose for which they were instituted: Tuggle c al.
v. Hamilton et al. (Si~preme Court of Georgia), 27 S. E. 987.
RECEIVERS.

A practical question, which has arisen in several instances
in recent railroad litigation, is the extent of the authority of a
now
receiver, appointed by the court: It seems
Receiver,
Authority,
well'established that such receiver, if appointed at
Mortgaged
the suit of a mortgage creditor, should not be
Property
given authority to take possession of any property
not covered by that particular mortgage. Kreling v. Kre/ing,
5o Pac. (Col.) 549, applies the same ruling to a small private
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mortgage, the ruling being that the receiver should not be authorized to take possession of unmortgaged realty claimed to
have been fraudulently conveyed by the mortgagor.
The practically important but theoretically uninteresting
to
Counsel Fees subject of when a receiver will be permitted
charge the fund with counsel fees is discussed in
Towles v. Union Bank, 82 Fed. 139.
ROAD LAW.

One of the few cases in which the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has reyersed the Superior Court of the same state
has recently been reported. The question was
Vacation of
Streets, Right upon the right of owners of properties which did
of Owners of not actually abut upon the part of a street which
Abutting was vacated-but which, it was claimed, were injured by the vacation-to recover compensation.
The Act of April 21, 1858, places the owner of land, which
has been injured by the vacation of a street, upon the same
footing to claim damages as the owner of land which has
been injured by the opening or widening of a street. An interesting review of many decisions of the courts of other
states is made in the opinion of Rice, P. J., who dissented
from the judgment of the Superior Court, and whose conclusion was that it is not decided by the great weight of authority
that there cannot be a recovery. He then discussed the question and reasoned in favor of the right of the claimants. The
Supreme Court sustained the views of the dissenting opinion.
The opinion of Fell, J., contains the following statement:
" Where the part of a street in front of a property is vacated,
the owner's right to compensation is conceded; but it is denied
unless there is an actual vacation and closing of the part of the
street on which the property abuts. It is evident, however, that
without the impairment of the owner's outlet in one direction
his property may be rendered comparatively worthless by a
change in the physical condition of a street. To draw the
line between owners who may and owners who may not recover at the point where the deprivation of access is total is to
draw it arbitrarily. The abutting owner's special right in a
strcet as a means of access to his property is not limited to
the part of the street on which his property abuts. Such a
limitation of the right would deny him compensation if all of
the street except the part immediately in firont of his property
were vacated. His right is the right of access in any direction
which the street permits. As affecting this right no distinction can be drawn between a partial and a total deprivation of
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access; the impairment of the right is a legal injury differing
in degree only from its total destruction. If the street is
so as to cut
Total and Part vacated on both sides of his property,
him off from other streets, his means of access is
Vacation,
Injury,
as effectually destroyed as if the entire street were
Degree,
vacated. If the street is vacated on one side only
Legal Damage and his property is left at the end of a cul-de-sac;
if the street is decreased in width so as to be impassable to
vehicles ; or if one means of access is taken away by the closing
of a back street or alley, his injury may be less, but the difference is one of degree only. In either case he has sustained a
loss by the destruction of an important element in the market
value of his property, and he has been injured in a legal
sense: hn re Vacation of Jk'lon Street, 38 Atl. 482. R 'eversing
i Pa. Superior Ct. 63.
SALES.

Where goods are sold to be delivered in lots as required by
the purchaser, and the latter thereafter accepts certain lots but
later refuses to receive another lot tendered on his
Non-Accept.
order, he does so at his peril, and if the goods in
ance, Tender the last lot are up to the contract, his refusal is a
breach, and the seller is not required to tender delivery of the
rest of the goods: Lackawanna JKls x-. Weil et al. (Supreme
Court), 47 N. Y. Suppl. 585.
The Supreme Court of New York, in Griggs v. Day et al.,
47 N. Y. Suppl. 6o9, decided that when a pledgor
Pledge,
Conversion, elected to treat an- unauthorized transaction of the
Ratification,

pledgee as a substitution of securities, and not as a

sale of the collateral to the pledgee, the pledgor
could not afterward, as against the pledgee, ratify the transaction as a sale.
When a broker receives deposits from a customer as margins to secure him against loss in buying and selling stocks
under the customer's orders, it is a fraud for him
Stock
Brokers,
to make fictitious purchases and sales, and report
Estoppel

Fraud,
Recovery of

Margins

them as genuine, and the customer may in such
case recover his deposits whether he suffered any

loss by the transactions or not: Prout v. Chiso/m (Supreme
Court), 47 N. Y. Suppl. 376.
SURETYSHIP.

The principles to be used in interpreting a contract of surety-
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ship are admirably set forth in Gamble v. Ames, 27 N. Y.
Contract,
Suppl. 48 : " It is quite true, that, in one sense,
Interpretathe contract of a surety is strictissimifluris, and it
lion, Measure is not to be extended beyond the express terms in
of Damages

which it is expressed.

The rule, however, is not

a rule of construction of a contract, but a rule of application
of the contract after the construction of it has been ascertained.
Where the question is as to the meaning of the language of
,the contract, there is no difference between the contract of the
surety and that of anybody else." Consequently, it was held
that an indemnity " to save him [plaintiff] harmless from any
damages which he should suffer by reason of his continuance
as one of the sureties upon an appeal," included, under the
circumstances, damages to plaintiff arising from his act of becoming surety, and not only such separate damages as might
.result from his continuing as such.
The su~rety for the payment of a mortgage debt is not discharged by a receipt given to their owners: "For
Discharge
of Surety,
Receipt,

the ensuing year, interest to be 5 per cent.," in-

stead of 6 per cent.

This is not a valid agreement,

even though executed, to extend the time for pay-

ment of the mortgage, or for the reduction of the rate of interest: JAL'ritt V. 1Jkum11tanls, 47 N. Y. Suppl. 664.

WATERS AND WATERCOURSES.

The Revised Statutes of Indiana of 1894. sec. 5153, c. 5,

authorize a railroad company to construct its road across any
Flood Waters, stream of water in such manner as to afford seLiability
curity for life and property, but provided that the
for Diverting corporation shall restore the stream so intersected
to its former state, or in a sufficient manner not unnecessarily to impair its usefulness or injure its franchises. The Supreme Court held, under this statute, that in intersecting such
a stream-where, during the rainy season, waters overflow the
ordinary channels and flow in high water channels, having
well defined beds and banks, and require a much wider waterway than at other seasons of the year-the company was
bound to provide for the stream in such condition; and, therefore, if any embankment built by it threw back water flowing
in such high water channels upon the land of another, the
company was liable for the damages sustained. Such water is
not surface water, as against which the company could build
an embankment, even to the detriment of another: N. Y C.
& St. L. R. R. v. Hamlet Hay Company, 47 N. E. io6o.
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The Court of Appeals in New York, in an interesting case,
has recently decided that the grant by Governor Nichols to
the inhabitants of the Village of New Harlem, of
Navigable
Stream,
certain lands, bounded on the east by the Harlem
Riparian
River, did not give the grantees any rights in the
Rights
tideway along the bank, between high and low
water mark, as against the public right to improve it for the
benefit of commerce, and that the City of New York, under a
grant of the tideway, made by Governor Dongan in i686, and
subsequently confirmed by the Colonial Legislature and the
Constitution of 1777, acquired the right to fill in the land between high and low water mark, and build wharves or other
works, in the interest of commerce, without compensation to
the owners of the upland: Sage v. The Mayor, &c., of. the
City of New York, 47 N. E. 1o96.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has decided that where
several factories were located for nearly a century along a
branch stream separated from the main stream by
Riparian
Rights,
an island, and where a dam had been built near
Statute of
the uppermost factory for a period considerably
Limitations,
over twenty-one years, presumably to secure an
Right to
Obstruct Use even flohw of water to all the factories, which dam
was operated by the upper owners according to the requirements of their business without any reference to the requirements of the lower owners, but without depriving them of
water, that such upper owner had no right, after using the
water he wished by day, to turn back the balance into the
main stream and so cut off the flow at night from one of the
lower owners, although the predecessors in title of such lower
owner may not have required the use of such water at night.
The right of a riparian owner being a right to use, subject to a
right of all others to use, he cannot obstruct the use of another
when such obstruction subserved no purpose of use by himself.
The court further intimated, although the point was not decided, that in its judgment a mere right to do wrong could
not be acquired by any lapse of time, no matter how great:
u hesville Water Co. v. Person, 182 Pa. 450.
WILLS.
The rule in Shelley's case has recently been before the
Superior Court'of Pennsylvania, who held that a devise "to
my four younger sons during their natural lifetime
Devise,
Rule in
to be equally divided between them . . . , and
Shelley's Case providing any of them dies without heirs the share
of the deceased shall be divided amongst the surviving ones,
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and at their death to be divided amongst their children, and
so on from one generation to another," vested a fee simple in
each of the four sons, on the ground that the failure of issue
contemplated was an indefinite failure which would give the
devisees a fee tail which by statute in Pennsylvania is conSverted into a fee simple: Seybcrtv. Hibbeot, 5 Pa. Supr. Ct., 537.
A testator in the first item of his will directed that all his
debts should be paid as soon as conveniently could be after his
After making provision for his wife he
Testamentary decease.
gave certain real estate to his son J., and all the
Charge on
rest of his real estate to his son T. After several
Land
pecuniary legacies he divided his personalty equally among
his children. He further directed that his son T. should pay
three-fourths of his debts and his son J. the other one-fourth.
T. and J. were made the executors of the will. There was no
direction in the will to sell land for the payment of debts or
legacies.
Upon a petition by the surviving executor, some eight years
after the death of the decedent, for an order to sell lands to
pay debts, it was held (i) that there was no express trust to
charge the debts as an indefinite lien on the real estate; (2)
that even if there was an implied trust it would not continue
the lien beyond the statutory period, which, at the time of the
testator's death, was five years: Mitchell's Estate, 182 Pa. 530.

